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Abstract—Modern low-latency anonymity systems, no matter
whether constructed as an overlay or implemented at the
network layer, offer limited security guarantees against traffic
analysis. On the other hand, high-latency anonymity systems
offer strong security guarantees at the cost of computational
overhead and long delays, which are excessive for interactive
applications. We propose TARANET, an anonymity system
that implements protection against traffic analysis at the net-
work layer, and limits the incurred latency and overhead.
In TARANET’s setup phase, traffic analysis is thwarted by
mixing. In the data transmission phase, end hosts and ASes
coordinate to shape traffic into constant-rate transmission us-
ing packet splitting. Our prototype implementation shows that
TARANET can forward anonymous traffic at over 50 Gbps
using commodity hardware.
1. Introduction
Users are increasingly aware of their lack of privacy and
are turning to anonymity systems to protect their commu-
nications. Tor [28] is currently the most popular anonymity
system, with over 2 million daily users [12]. Unfortunately,
Tor offers neither satisfactory performance nor strong an-
onymity. With respect to performance, Tor is implemented
as an overlay network and uses a per-hop reliable transport,
increasing both propagation and queuing latency [29]. With
respect to anonymity guarantees, Tor is vulnerable to traffic
analysis [50, 52, 49, 62].
Users also have the option of anonymity systems with
stronger guarantees such as DC-nets [20, 33, 67], Mix
networks [21, 14], and peer-to-peer protocols [58, 31]. How-
ever, these systems either scale poorly or incur prohibitive
latency and reliability, making them unsuitable for many
practical applications.
In an effort to improve the performance of anonym-
ity networks, research has built on the idea of network-
layer anonymity (e.g., LAP [39], Dovetail [57], and HOR-
NET [22]). Network-layer anonymity systems assume that
the network infrastructure (e.g., routers) participates in es-
tablishing anonymous communication channels and assists
in forwarding anonymous traffic. Intermediate anonymity
supporting network nodes (or nodes for short) first cooperate
with senders to establish anonymous sessions or circuits,
and then process and forward traffic from those senders to
receivers. While these systems achieve high throughput and
low latency, the security guarantees of these systems are no
stronger than Tor’s. Moreover, LAP and Dovetail leak the
position of intermediate nodes on the path and the total path
length, which reduces the anonymity set size, facilitating de-
anonymization [22].
The problem space appears to have an unavoidable
tradeoff: strong anonymity appears achievable only through
drastically higher overhead [27]. In this paper, we aim to
push the boundaries of this anonymity/performance tradeoff
by combining the speed of network-layer anonymity systems
with strong defenses.
To improve the anonymity guarantees, traffic analy-
sis attacks need to be prevented, or made significantly
harder/costlier to perform. The common method to achieve
this is to insert chaff, which are dummy packets which
to an adversary look indistinguishable from encrypted data
packets. By mixing chaff with data packets, one can add
noise to the underlying traffic patterns to defeat traffic
analysis. For example, one can insert chaff to maintain a
constant transmission rate on an adversarial network link, so
that the traffic patterns observed by the observing adversary
stay unchanged and leak no identifying information.
However, both existing methods of applying chaff traffic,
i.e., constant-transmission-rate link padding [65, 31, 42, 41]
and probabilistic end-to-end padding [44, 54], are un-
satisfactory. On one hand, constant-transmission-rate link
padding uses chaff to shape traffic between adjacent pairs
of nodes making it perfectly homogeneous, thus provably
concealing the underlying traffic patterns from a network
adversary. However, a compromised node is able to distin-
guish chaff traffic from real traffic, giving link padding no
anonymity guarantees when compromised nodes are present.
On the other hand, probabilistic end-to-end padding enables
end hosts to generate chaff traffic that is indistinguishable
from real traffic, but existing schemes [44, 54] fail to fully
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conceal the end-to-end transmission rate and can be defeated
by packet-density attack [59].
We take the best of both worlds and propose a new
method of applying chaff traffic that has so far not been
explored: an end-to-end padding scheme that shapes a flow’s
traffic pattern into constant-rate transmission on all tra-
versed links. At a flow’s origin, the sender divides its traffic
into small flowlets that transmit packets at a globally-fixed
constant rate. Each forwarding node modulates the outgoing
transmission rate of each flowlet so that the transmission rate
remains constant over time and also remains constant across
all links traversed by the flowlet. This approach prevents
traffic patterns from propagating across nodes. We call this
technique end-to-end traffic shaping.
However, end-to-end traffic shaping is surprisingly tricky
to achieve in the presence of natural packet loss, adversar-
ial packet drops, or packet propagation delays. The main
challenge for coordinated traffic shaping is how to maintain
constant-rate transmission across all traversing links when
a forwarding node’s incoming transmission rate is lower
than the outgoing transmission rate. A simple approach that
enables a forwarding nodes to create valid packets to send
toward the destination appears promising, but unfortunately,
this approach could be abused, as packet injection requires
the cryptographic keys that the sender shares with down-
stream nodes. Moreover, such an approach would enable
two malicious nodes that are on the same flowlet path to
trivially link observed packets of the same flowlet. Simi-
larly, allowing a node to replay existing packets cannot be
permitted, as replicated packets themselves would constitute
a trivially detectable pattern.
An initial idea is to enable each node to have a spare
packet queue, containing packets that can be sent to make
up for the difference between the incoming transmission rate
and the required outgoing transmission rate. But this poses a
conundrum: how can we fill up the spare packet buffer if the
flowlet rate remains constant in the first place? Our solution
is packet splitting, a cryptographic mechanism which allows
an end host to generate a packet that splits into two different
valid packets of the same size as the original packet at a
specific node. Through splittable packets, an end host can
fill up the spare packet queue at forwarding nodes, which in
turn enables constant-rate transmission even in case of lost
or delayed incoming packets.
In this paper, we propose TARANET, a scalable, high-
speed, and traffic-analysis-resistant anonymous communi-
cation protocol, which uses the end-to-end traffic shaping
assisted by packet splitting as one of its novel mechanisms.
TARANET is directly built into the network infrastructure
to achieve short paths and high throughput. It uses mixing
for its setup phase and end-to-end traffic shaping for its data
transmission phase to resist traffic analysis. Our paper makes
the following contributions:
1) We propose an efficient end-to-end traffic shaping tech-
nique that maintains per-flow constant-rate transmis-
sion on all links and defeats traffic analysis attacks. We
also propose in-network packet splitting as the enabling
mechanism for the end-to-end traffic shaping technique.
2) We present an onion routing protocol that enables
payload integrity protection, replay detection, and split-
table packets, which are essential building blocks for
end-to-end traffic shaping.
3) We design, implement, and evaluate the security and
performance of TARANET. Our prototype running on
commodity hardware can forward over 50 Gbps of
anonymous traffic, showing the feasibility to deploy
TARANET on high-speed links.
2. Background and Related Work
This section presents background on network-layer ano-
nymity protocols. We also discuss adversarial traffic analysis
techniques to de-anonymize end points, focusing on those
that current network-layer anonymity protocols fail to deter.
2.1. Network-layer Anonymity Protocols
Recent research [39, 57, 22] proposes network-layer an-
onymity systems that incorporate anonymous communication
as a service of network infrastructures in the Internet and
next generation network architectures [69, 32, 70]. The basic
assumption of a network-layer anonymity system is that Au-
tonomous Systems (AS) can conduct efficient cryptographic
operations when forwarding packets to conceal forwarding
information. Additionally, a network-layer anonymity sys-
tem uses direct forwarding paths rather than reroute packets
through overlay networks as in Tor [28]. This processing
would be done on (software) routers, for instance, but more
abstractedly the term node is used to refer to the device or
set of devices dedicated to the anonymity system within an
AS.
A network-layer anonymity system anonymizes its traf-
fic by relying on ASes to collaboratively hide the forwarding
paths between senders and receivers. We remark that a
network-layer anonymity system can offer neither sender
anonymity nor recipient anonymity as defined by Pfizmann
and Ko¨hntopp [53]. A compromised first-hop AS on the
path can observe the sender of a message, violating sender
anonymity. Similarly, a compromised last-hop AS can iden-
tify the receiver, which breaks recipient anonymity. Instead,
a network-layer anonymity system offers relationship ano-
nymity [53] that prevents linking two end hosts of a message.
Besides anonymity, the basic design goals for a network-
layer anonymity system are scalability and performance.
With respect to scalability, a network-layer anonymity sys-
tem minimizes the amount of state kept on network routers
who possess limited high-speed memory. With respect to
performance, a network-layer anonymity system should of-
fer low latency and high throughput.
HORNET [22] improves on the security guarantees for
network-layer protocols by using full onion encryption to
guarantee bitwise unlinkability. HORNET introduces sev-
eral useful primitives for stateless onion routing, which we
extend in TARANET.
HORNET is circuit-based like overlay systems, but it
operates at the network layer. As with LAP and Dovetail,
processing data packets at intermediate nodes requires only
symmetric cryptography. This design comes at the expense
of a relatively slow round-trip time for setup packets which
requires nodes on the path to perform public-key cryptog-
raphy at the start of each session. During setup, the sender
establishes keys between itself and every node on the path.
The sender embeds these keys along with routing informa-
tion for each hop into the header of each subsequent data
packet. Since the state is carried within packets, intermediate
nodes do not have to keep per-flow state, which enables high
scalability.
Through bit-pattern unlinkability in its traffic and con-
fidentiality of the packet’s path information, HORNET can
defend against passive adversaries matching packets based
on packet contents. Nevertheless, the protocol is vulnerable
to more sophisticated active attacks. HORNET headers are
re-used for all data packets in a session, and payloads are not
integrity-protected. Thus, HORNET cannot protect against
packet replays since an adversary could change a payload
arbitrarily, making the packet look indistinguishable from a
legitimate new packet to the processing node. Such a replay
attack can be used in conjunction with traffic analysis to
insert recognizable fingerprints into flows, which can help
de-anonymize communicating endpoints.
Lightweight anonymity systems. The first class of
network-layer anonymity protocols proposed is the so-
called lightweight system, which consists of two proposals,
LAP [39] and Dovetail [57]. These systems defend against
topological attacks by encrypting forwarding information
in packet headers. However, in both schemes, packets stay
unchanged from hop to hop, thus enabling bit-pattern cor-
relation of packets at distinct compromised nodes.
2.2. Traffic Analysis Attacks
Traffic analysis aims to identify communicating end-
points based on metadata such as volume, traffic patterns,
and timing. The literature broadly classifies traffic analysis
techniques into passive and active, depending on whether
the adversary manipulates traffic.
2.2.1. Passive Attacks. Flow dynamics matching. An ad-
versary eavesdropping on traffic at two observation points
(including an adversary observing the ingress and egress
traffic of a single node) can try to detect whether (some of)
the packets seen at the observation points belong to the same
flow by searching for similarities among the dynamics of all
observed flows [72, 45, 50, 47]. For example, the adversary
can monitor packet inter-arrival times, flow volume [16], or
on/off flow patterns [66, 71].
Template attacks. An adversary can construct a database
of traffic patterns (templates) obtained by accessing known
websites or other web-services through the anonymous com-
munication system. When eavesdropping on the traffic of
a client, the adversary compares the observed flows with
the patterns stored in the database, and if a match is found
the adversary is able to guess the website or web-service
accessed by the client with high probability [34, 40, 64].
Network statistics correlation. Another possible attack
consists in monitoring network characteristics of different
parts of the network, and comparing them to the char-
acteristics of targeted anonymized flows. For instance, by
comparing the round-trip time (RTT) of a target bidirectional
flow with the RTTs measured to a large set of network
locations, an adversary can identify the probable network
location of an end host in case the RTT of the flow showed
strong correlation with the RTT to one of the monitored
network locations [35]. Similarly, by simply the throughput
(over time) of a unidirectional flow and comparing it with
the throughput to various network location, the adversary
can guess the end host’s location [48].
2.2.2. Active Attacks. Active traffic analysis uses similar
techniques as passive traffic analysis, but it additionally
involves traffic manipulation by the adversary, in particular
packet delaying and dropping, to introduce specific patterns.
Chakravarty et al. [18] show that active analysis can have
high success rates even when working with aggregate Net-
flow data instead of raw packet traces.
Flow dynamics modification. By modifying the flow dy-
namics (inter-packet timings), the adversary can add a wa-
termark (or tag) to the flow, which the adversary is then
able to detect when observing the flow at another point
in the network [66, 38, 36]. This attack is known as flow
watermarking. A similiar attack, called flow fingerprinting,
enables an adversary to encode more information into the
flow dynamics, which can later be extracted from the same
flow seen at another point in the network [37]. For both
attacks, depending on the coding technique, flows may
require more or fewer packets for the watermark/fingerprint
to be reliably identified within the network.
Clogging Attacks. Flow dynamics modification requires
that the adversary control multiple observation points in
the network. Clogging attacks are similar, but the adversary
only needs to be able to observe the target flow at a single
network location. For these attacks, the adversary causes
network congestion [50, 30], or fluctuation [19] at other
nodes in the network, and then observes whether these
actions affect the observed target flow. If so, it is likely
that the target flow traverses the nodes at which conges-
tion/fluctuation has been caused.
2.3. Chaff-based Defenses
Adding chaff traffic (also referred to as padding traffic
or dummy traffic) is a defense mechanism that thwarts
traffic analysis by concealing real traffic patterns. An im-
portant family of chaff-based anonymity protocols uses link
padding [59, 65, 31, 42, 41]. Link padding, used together
with link encryption, allows neighboring forwarding nodes
to add chaff to shape the patterns of all traffic on a network
link into either constant-rate transmission [59, 65] or a pre-
determined packet schedule [31, 42, 41]. However, because
in link padding a node is able to distinguish chaff packets
from real packets, attackers that compromise nodes are still
capable of identifying the underlying traffic patterns and
conduct traffic analysis.
Another class of chaff-based protocols uses end-to-end
padding [44]. In the end-to-end padding scheme, end hosts
craft chaff packets that traverse the network together with
real packets, and the added chaff packets carry flags to
inform the forwarding nodes about when to drop the chaff
packets. Thus, an end host’s traffic demonstrates different
patterns as the traffic traverse the network. Compared to
link padding, in end-to-end padding a compromised node
cannot distinguish chaff traffic from real traffic, and is thus
unable to discover the real traffic patterns. Nevertheless, the
existing work, defensive dropping [44], fails to fully conceal
the timing information of the real traffic, and is trivially
defeated by measuring packet density [59].
3. Problem Definition
We consider a scenario where an adversary secretly
conducts a network mass-surveillance program. By stealthily
tapping into inter-continental fiber links, or by controlling a
set of domestic ISPs/IXPs, the adversary gains bulk access to
network traffic. Besides matching identifiers to filter packets,
the adversary is also capable of conducting traffic manipu-
lation and traffic pattern matching. A pair of anonymity-
conscious users would like to communicate through the
network, hiding the fact that they are communicating from
the adversary. The communication between the pair of users
is bi-directional. Without loss of generality, we call the user
that initiates the anonymous communication sender, and the
other user receiver.
3.1. Network Assumptions
The underlying network is divided into ASes, or simply
nodes. Each node forwards packets according to a routing
segment. Each routing segment contains forwarding infor-
mation for a node between the sender and the receiver. For a
sender to reach a receiver, the sender can obtain a sequence
of routing segments, named path.
Except the ingress and egress links that are needed as
forwarding information through an AS, routing segments
should leak no extra information about the end hosts or
the path before or after the forwarding node. This prop-
erty is satisfied by several next-generation Internet architec-
tures that use source-controlled routing (e.g., SCION [70],
NIRA [69], or Pathlet [32]), or in the Internet through IPv6
Segment Routing [9].
3.2. Threat Model
We consider a global active adversary, that is capable of
controlling all links between any pair of ASes, or between
an AS and an end host. This means that the adversary has
bulk access to contents and timing information of packets on
all links and can also inject, drop, delay, replay, and modify
packets. We additionally assume that the adversary is able
to compromise a fraction of ASes. By compromising an
AS, the adversary learns all keys and settings, has access to
all traffic that traverses the compromised AS, and is able to
control the AS including delaying, redirecting, and dropping
traffic, as well as fabricating, replaying, and modifying
packets. We only guarantee relationship anonymity for end
hosts if there exists at least one uncompromised AS on
the path between sender and receiver. We remark that the
adversary under this assumption is able to perform all traffic
analysis attacks in Section 2.2.
3.3. TARANET Goals
Anonymity. TARANET aims to provide relationship ano-
nymity (defined by Pfizmann and Ko¨hntopp [53]) when a
sender and a receiver share mutual trust. We refer to the rela-
tionship anonymity under this condition as third-party rela-
tionship anonymity. While requiring trust in receivers limits
our protocol’s application scope, third-party anonymity is
actually sufficient when communicating parties are authen-
ticated end-to-end (e.g., VoIP), when avoiding censorship
where the receiver (e.g., a foreign news site) is known not to
cooperate with the censoring entity, when a warrant canary
(e.g., www.rsync.net/resources/notices/canary.txt) has been
recently updated for that endpoint, or when the receiver is
a trusted node acting as a proxy.
High throughput and low latency. The processing over-
head should be small, i.e., it should only require symmetric
cryptographic operations and access to a small amount of
easy-to-manage per-flow state. Consequently, an efficient
implementation (running at line speed) on a network device
should be possible with a small amount of extra hardware.
Scalability. Nodes should be capable of handling the large
volume of simultaneous connections as observed on Internet
core routers. TARANET aims to minimize the amount of
per-flow state maintained. Specifically, TARANET guaran-
tees that the amount of state on a router is bounded given
a fixed throughput. Moreover, adding new nodes to the
network should additionally not require coordination with
all other nodes.
4. Protocol Design
Communication Model. Hosts communicate anonymously
through TARANET-enabled Autonomous Systems (ASes)
using flowlets. A TARANET flowlet allows an end host to
send traffic anonymously at a constant rate B for a fixed
time period T . All anonymous traffic is divided into a set
of flowlets by end hosts to leverage TARANET’s service.
Figure 1 graphs the lifecycle of a TARANET flowlet.
A flowlet’s life-cycle begins with a setup phase fol-
lowed by a data transmission phase. At the beginning of
the setup phase, a sender first anonymously retrieves two
paths: a forward path from the sender to the receiver and
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Figure 1. TARANET design overview.
a backward path from the receiver back to the sender. A
path contains the routing segments, the public keys, and
the certificates of all nodes between the two end hosts.
One mechanism for anonymously retrieving paths is to have
end hosts query global topology servers through TARANET
flowlets that are established using network configuration
information (e.g., distributed to end hosts through a DHCP-
like infrastructure [22]). Another mechanism is to dissem-
inate paths and public keys throughout the network to end
hosts, as done in certain future network architectures (e.g.,
NIRA [69], Pathlets [32]). A third mechanism could be
based on private information retrieval (PIR) [23], which
allows to trade off a lower communication overhead for an
increased computation overhead on the servers providing the
network information and the keys.
Once the sender successfully obtains both paths, the
sender and the receiver exchange two setup messages
traversing the obtained paths. By processing a setup mes-
sage, each on-path node establishes a shared symmetric key
with the sender. The per-node shared key is later used to con-
ceal routing information by layered encryption/decryption
in the data transmission phase. To prevent storing per-flow
cryptographic state on each node, a node encrypts the shared
key using a local secret key that the node never reveals. The
resulting encrypted shared key, which we call the Forward-
ing Segment (FS), is carried by all data packets and allows
the node to dynamically retrieve its shared symmetric key.
With routing segments, FSes, and per-node symmetric
keys, the sender is able to create TARANET data packets
that can reach the receiver. An on-path node can process a
data packet with only symmetric cryptographic operations,
enabling highly efficient packet forwarding. Within the first
batch of packets along the forward path, the sender transmits
all routing segments, FSes, and shared symmetric keys for
the backward path, so that the receiver can send packets
back to the sender.
Traffic analysis resistance. TARANET resists traffic anal-
ysis attacks by combining an onion routing protocol (an
enhanced adaptation of the one in HORNET), a newly pro-
posed end-to-end traffic shaping scheme, and mixing. First,
compared to HORNET which provisions confidentiality, au-
thenticity, and bit pattern unlinkability, TARANET addition-
ally offers payload integrity protection, replay protection,
and packet splitting, which is a vital enabling technique for
the end-to-end traffic shaping scheme (Section 4.1). Second,
for the data transmission phase, TARANET enables end-to-
end traffic normalization for flowlet traffic. For each flowlet,
the sender and receiver maintain a constant transmission rate
shared by every end host. Each forwarding node maintains
the same constant transmission rate for outgoing packets
belonging to the flowlet (Section 4.2). Third, for messages
in the setup phase, TARANET requires each node to conduct
mixing [21] in order to prevent linking messages based on
their timing and order (Section 4.3). Finally, to hide the
difference between setup packets and data packets and to
defeat a global eavesdropper that monitors the number of
flowlets on links between nodes, TARANET additionally
requires neighboring nodes to perform link encryption and
link padding (Section 4.4).
The rationale for adopting different techniques for the
setup phase and the data transmission phase is due to our
observation of the different performance requirements in
these two phases. Regarding the setup phase, assuming a
large number of simultaneous connection setups, batching
setup messages on a node will result in a small delay
for the setup phase. Moreover, because changing the order
of messages received by a node has no impact on the
performance of the setup phase, we can randomize the order
of messages within each batch. Finally, since processing
a chaff setup message requires public-key cryptographic
operations, creating chaff setup messages would result in
a large computational overhead.
For the data transmission phase, on the other hand,
because packet order is important for TCP performance,
randomizing the message order severely impacts application
performance. Additionally, because data packet processing
is highly efficient, we can actively conduct traffic shaping
on both end hosts and intermediate nodes by using chaff
packets (Section 4.2).
4.1. TARANET Onion Routing Protocol
Like the HORNET onion routing protocol [22], the
TARANET protocol offers bit-pattern unlinkability, pay-
load confidentiality, and per-hop authenticity. Bit-pattern
unlinkability eliminates any identifiers that facilitate packet
matching. Payload confidentiality prevents leaking upper-
layer sensitive information. Finally, each TARANET header
contains per-hop MACs that protect the integrity of both
the header and the payload, unlike HORNET, whose per-
hop integrity guarantees only cover the header. Therefore,
in TARANET, tampered or forged packets will be detected
by benign nodes on the path and dropped immediately.
TARANET also adopts the scalable design of HOR-
NET, i.e., using packet-carried forwarding state. Storing per-
flowlet state at core routers requires a large amount of high-
speed memory, precluding scalability. Thus, in line with
state-of-the-art network-layer anonymity protocols [39, 57,
22], TARANET embeds all necessary forwarding state (e.g.,
onion decryption keys, next-hop information, control flags)
in packet headers instead of storing the state on routers.
Protocol Bit-patternunlinkability Scalability
Payload
Integrity
Replay
Protection
Packet
Splitting
HORNET Yes Yes No No No
TARANET Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1. COMPARISON BETWEEN TARANET AND HORNET ONION
ROUTING PROTOCOLS
We highlight three new features that TARANET intro-
duces for the data transmission phase compared to HOR-
NET. First, integrity protection is extended to data packets’
payloads, eliminating tagging attacks targeting at manipulat-
ing data payloads to create recognizable patterns. Second,
data packets within the same flowlet have unique identifiers
bound to the packets themselves, enabling replay protection.
Third, TARANET allows an end host to create special chaff
packets, each of which splits into two packets at a specific
node. To all other nodes, the original packet and the resulting
packets are indistinguishable from ordinary data packets in
the same flowlet. Split packets traverse the same path as
other packets in the flowlet and their per-hop MACs need
to be correct at each downstream node. Splitting a chaff
packet into multiple packets plays a vital role in the end-
to-end traffic shaping technique described in Section 4.2.
We defer the detailed description of the technical aspects of
packet splitting to Section 5.
Replay protection. In TARANET, each TARANET packet
header is uniquely identifiable, enabling intermediate nodes
to detect replay attacks by checking the header’s freshness.
Specifically, an intermediate node can retrieve 3 fields from
each packet: (1) a shared secret with the sender, (2) a per-
packet Initial Vector (IV), and (3) a per-packet expiration
time. The first two fields together uniquely identify a packet
and are used as input to membership queries and for the
insertions to the replay detector. The third field is used to
check and drop expired packets.
TARANET nodes detect replayed packets by maintain-
ing a rotating Bloom filters composed of 3 subject Bloom
filters, as described by Lee et al. [43]. A packet received at
t = [i· TTL2 , (i+1)· TTL2 ] is checked against all 3 filters and
is only inserted into i′-th Bloom filter, where i′ ∼= i mod 3.
The i-th subject filter is cleared at time (3N+ i) · TTL2 (N is
an integer). The rotating Bloom filter guarantees that each
packet inserted has a lifetime between TTL and 32TTL,
where TTL is the maximum lifetime of a packet. To reduce
cache misses and increase performance, we also use blocked
Bloom filters [56] instead of standard Bloom filters.
Replay detection state is not per-flow state, since the size
of the detector grows linearly with its node’s bandwidth,
and not with the number of flowlets traversing that node.
The size of our detector is ~15 MB1 for a 10 Gbps link
when the false positive rate is at most 10−6 and TTL = 6 s
(the maximum packet lifetime we consider in Section 5.4.1).
Each false positive result causes the corresponding packet to
be dropped. Given that the packet drop rate of the Internet
is around 0.2% [61], we could reduce the detector’s size by
allowing higher false positive rate.
4.2. End-to-end Traffic Shaping
Flowlet. Our basic idea for defending data transmission
against traffic analysis is to shape traffic from heterogeneous
applications into constant-rate transmission. A flowlet is the
basic unit through which an end host is able to transmit
packets at a constant throughput B and for a maximum
lifetime T . During the lifetime T of a flowlet, the end
host always transfers packets at rate B, inserting chaff
packets if necessary. More generally, if an end host needs
to transfer data at rate B′ for time T ′, it initiates a sequence
of dT ′/T e flowlet batches, each of which contains dB′/Be
simultaneous flowlets.
An end host shuts down a flowlet before the flowlet
expires when there is no more data to send. When shutting
down multiple simultaneous flowlets, an end host pads each
flowlet with a random number of packets to prevent linking
the flowlets by their expiration times. A node erases local
state and terminates a flowlet when there are no more
packets in its outgoing packet queue.
The key property of a flowlet is to maintain constant
transmission rates not only at end hosts but also on all
traversed links, for which the flowlet relies on end-to-
end padding instead of link padding. In link padding, a
pair of neighboring intermediate nodes coordinate to inject
chaff to maintain a constant sending rate on a link. While
link padding is effective against a network adversary, it is
insufficient in the case of compromised nodes, since they
can distinguish chaff inserted by neighbors from actual data
packets. To defend against compromised nodes, we need
chaff packets that are indistinguishable from data packets.
Because TARANET uses onion encryption as a basic build-
ing block, one can create such indistinguishable chaff only
when possessing shared keys with all traversing nodes. Thus,
only sending end hosts are able to create such chaff.
Necessity of packet splitting. To achieve constant-rate
transmission, every flowlet should ideally arrive and leave
with rate B at every node. However, drops/jitter may cause
the incoming rate to vary: a higher rate is absorbed by the
queues, but a lower rate requires that the node be able to
produce “extra packets”, which need to resemble legitimate
packets to any downstream node. This implies that these
packets must also be generated by the sender like end-to-end
chaff. But since the sender cannot send at a rate higher than
B, it cannot send additional packets for the nodes to cache
and use when needed. The only option then seems to be to
have very long queues, and let each node fill a significant
1. Computed using the CAIDA dataset described in Section 7.
fraction of them with packets when the transmission of the
flowlet first begins, before the node starts forwarding packets
for that flowlet. However, this requires far too much state,
and also adds significant latency in terms of time to the first
byte, making this option unfeasible. The apparent dilemma
can be solved with a technique we call packet splitting.
The packet splitting technique allows an end host to
create a packet that can be split into two packets at a
specific intermediate node.2 The resulting packets should
be indistinguishable from other non-splittable packets. This
requirement indicates that the resulting packets should still
traverse the same path and reach the recipient’s end host.
We present the algorithm to split packets in Section 5.
Traffic shaping for flowlet outgoing rate. To enable end-
to-end traffic shaping, for each on-path node ni, an end
host selects a slot in its transmission buffer with probability
Prspliti and fills in a newly generated splittable chaff packet
that will split at node ni. As an optimization, the end host
can also select a slot that already contains chaff packets
and replace it with splittable chaff packets. When a node
receives a packet that should be split at the node, the node
performs the split and caches resulting packets in its chaff
packet queue.
Each node maintains a per-flowlet chaff queue of cached
chaff packets. To guarantee an invariant outgoing flowlet
rate, nodes periodically output a data packet from the data
packet queue. In case that the data packet queue is empty, the
node outputs a chaff packet from the flowlet’s chaff queue.
We limit the chaff queue size by a maximal length Lchf . In
the (unlikely) scenario where the chaff queue is also empty,
a local per-flowlet failure counter h is increased. When h
exceeds a threshold H negotiated during flowlet setup, the
node terminates the flowlet. H is a security parameter of the
flowlet that determines how sensitive the flowlet is against
potential malicious packet drops.
When a node shuts down a flowlet, an intermediate node
no longer receives packets from upstream nodes. It will first
drain its local chaff packet queue and then terminate the
flowlet when the threshold H is reached. We remark that
such a termination process results in successive termination
on nodes and small variable intervals between termination
times on different nodes because of the variable number of
cached chaff packets.
We remark that both the chaff queues and failure coun-
ters constitute per-flow state. Nevertheless, the amount of
state stored on a node is bounded by the node’s bandwidth.
Because each flowlet consumes a fixed amount of band-
width, a node with fixed total bandwidth is only capable
of serving a fixed number of flowlets. Thus, the amount of
state that a node maintains for its flowlets is bounded given
its total available bandwidth. Accordingly, a node will have
to refuse setup messages for new flowlets if its bandwidth
is already fully occupied. We evaluate the amount of state
the queues require in detail in Section 7.
2. The general packet splitting technique supports a n-way split. We con-
sider only two-way packet splits because of limited Maximum Transmission
Units (MTU) in the network.
4.3. Mixing in the Setup Phase
Each TARANET node applies a basic form of mixing
when processing setup messages. After a setup message is
processed by an intermediate node, the node queues the
message locally into batches of size m. Once there are
enough setup messages to form a batch, the node first
randomizes the message order within each batch and then
sends out the batch.
Through batching and order randomization, a
TARANET node aims to obscure the timing and order for
setup messages. An adversary that observes both input and
output setup messages of a non-compromised node cannot
match an output packet to its corresponding input packet
within the batch.
The batching technique introduces additional latency be-
cause the setup messages have to wait until enough messages
are accumulated. Assume that rsetup is the number of in-
coming setup messages every second, the added latency can
be computed as mrsetup . Given the large number of simultane-
ous connections within the network, the introduced latency
is very low, as shown by our evaluation in Section 7.2.
4.4. Link Encryption and Padding
Each pair of neighboring TARANET nodes agree upon
a constant transmission rate upon link setup. The negotiated
transmission rate determines the maximum total rate for
data packets. When the actual transmission rate exceeds
the negotiated rate on a link, the sending node drops the
excessive packets. When the actual transmission rate is
lower than the negotiated rate, the sending node will add
chaff traffic. The chaff traffic inserted by an intermediate
node to shape traffic on a link only traverses the link and is
dropped by the neighboring node.
To prevent an adversary observing a link between two
honest nodes from distinguishing chaff traffic from actual
data traffic, all pairs of neighboring nodes negotiate a sym-
metric key through the Diffie-Hellman protocol, and use it to
encrypt all packets transmitted on their shared link. This also
makes setup messages and data packets indistinguishable.
As an optimization to reduce chaff traffic and improve
bandwidth usage, we additionally allow neighboring nodes
to agree on a schedule of transmission rates as long as
transmission rate is detached from the dynamics of indi-
vidual traffic rates. For example, because the actual link
rate on a link often demonstrates similarity at the same
time of different days, we can reduce the amount of chaff
traffic by setting the transmission rate between [t, t′] to
B[t,t′] + k ·Σ[t,t′]. B[t,t′] is the historic average transmission
rate between [t, t′], Σ[t,t′] is the standard deviation for the
transmission rate, k is a factor that allows administrators to
account for temporal changes of the bandwidth usage.
5. Protocol Details
This section presents the details of TARANET data
packet formats and processing functions. We show how to
create a fixed-size packet that can be split into two new
packets of the same size whose per-hop MAC can still be
verified. Using the packet processing functions, we present
the TARANET data transmission phase on end hosts and
intermediate nodes.
5.1. Notation
We first describe our notation. In general, symdir stands
for the symbol sym of a specific direction dir ∈ {f, b},
which is either forward (src to dst) or backward (dst to src).
symdiri indicates the symbol sym belongs to i-th node n
dir
i
on the path in direction dir. For simplicity, we denote the
set of all sym for a path pdir as {symdiri }. We also define
a series of string operations: 0z is a string of zeros with
length z; |σ| is the length of the string σ; σ[m..n] refers to
the substring between m-th bit to n-th bit of string σ where
m starts from 0; σ1 ‖ σ2 stands for concatenation of string
σ1 and σ2. Table 2 summarizes the notation in this paper.
Symbol Meaning
k security parameter used in the protocol
c size of per-hop segment
b size of control bits and expiration time
r maximum path length permitted by the protocol
m fixed-size of a data packet payload
pdir path of a specific direction dir
ldir length of a path pdir
ndiri the i-th node on path p
dir
xdiri , g
xdiri the private and public key pair of node ndiri
hop a hash function to generate the key for op
R routing segment, e.g., the ingress and egress ports
EXPi expiration time for a packet at node ni
FS forwarding segment
s a symmetric onion key shared with the sender
IV per-packet initial vector
γ per-hop MAC
β the opaque component of a packet header
O onion data packet
Table 2. NOTATION USED IN THE PAPER.
5.2. Initialization & Setup Phase
In the setup phase, the sender node aims to anonymously
establish a set of shared keys {sdiri } with all nodes on the
forward and backward path, and a shared key sSD with the
receiver. In the following protocol description and in our
implementation, we use HORNET’s Sphinx-based single-
round-trip setup [22]. Note that we can also set up flowlets
using Tor’s telescopic method [28] which increases latency,
but preserves perfect forward secrecy.
Once the setup phase is complete, in addition to the
shared keys, the sender also obtains from each node on both
paths a Forwarding Segment (FS) [22, Section 4]. The FS
created by the node ndiri contains the key shared between
the sender and that node sdiri and the routing information
Rdiri which tells the node how to reach the next hop on the
path. The FS is encrypted using a secret value known only
to the router that created the FS. As shown in Section 5.4,
these FSes are included in every data packet: each node can
then the retrieve the FS it created, decrypt it, and recover
padding
bits
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Figure 2. TARANET packet format.
the packet processing information within. Unlike HORNET,
we do not store the expiration time EXP in a FS, but include
it alongside the FS in the packet (see Section 5.3.2). This
allows the sender to set a different expiration time for each
packet and limit the time window in which the packet is
valid, which is necessary for replay protection.
5.3. Data Packet Processing
5.3.1. Requirements. TARANET data packets are fixed-
size onion packets whose integrity is protected by per-hop
MAC. Processing these packets should satisfy the following
three requirements:
• An output packet cannot be linked to the correspond-
ing input packet without compromising the processing
node’s local secret value.
• Processing a packet cannot leak a node’s position on
the path.
• Processing a packet cannot change the packet size
regardless of underlying operations.
The last requirement is particularly challenging to sat-
isfy, since TARANET allows flow mutations. Consider the
split operation, which takes a fixed-size packet and creates
two uncorrelated packets of the same size. The splitting
procedure needs to ensure that subsequent nodes can verify
the MACs in both new packets.
5.3.2. Data packet format. TARANET data packets are
shown in Figure 2. At the beginning of each packet is an
IV field that carries a fresh initial vector for each packet
in a flowlet. After the IV field are four fields that form
an onion layer: an FS, a per-hop MAC, control bits, and
the expiration time. The rest of the fields, including the rest
of header information, padding bits, and the payload, are
encrypted, and are thus opaque to the processing node.
When a packet arrives, the first three fields are accessible
to a node without requiring cryptographic processing, so we
call these fields as public state. The control bits and the
expiration time are only available after the node decrypts
the packet, so they are called secret state. In addition, each
header is padded to a fixed size regardless of the actual
number of nodes on the path, and the padding bits are
inserted between the header and the payload.
5.3.3. TARANET packet creation. Both end hosts gener-
ate data packets using a subroutine shown in Algorithm 1.
The subroutine creates an onion packet to be forwarded from
node nk to node nl. For each onion layer, it computes a
per-hop MAC (Line 14) and onion-encrypts both the header
(Line 12) and the payload (Line 14).
One important feature of this onion encryption algorithm
is to add per-hop state (specifically, an FS, a MAC, control
bits and an expiration time) to the packet header without
changing its total size. The function achieves this feature by
strategically pre-computing the padding bits in the header
(Line 6) to ensure that the trailing c bits of header after
encryption are always equal to 0c. As a result, the trailing
zero bits can be truncated without losing information when
the header is encrypted again (Line 12).
1: procedure CREATE ONION ROUTINE
Input: {si}, {FSi}, {ctrli}, {EXPi}, IV , k, l, O . with k < l
Output: (IVk,FSk, γk, βk, Ok)
2: φk ← ε
3: IVk ← IV
4: for i← k + 1, . . . , l do
5: IVi ← PRP(hPRP(s); IVi−1)
6: φi ← (φi−1 ‖ 0c) ⊕
PRG(hPRG(si−1 ⊕ IVi−1))[(r−i−1)c+b..rc+b−1]
7: end for
8: βl ←
{
RAND(c(r − l − 1)) ‖ φl
}
9: Ol ← ENC(hENC(sl); IVl;O)
10: γl ← MAC(hMAC(sl ‖ IVl);FS l ‖ βl ‖Ol)
11: for i← (l − 1), . . . , k do
12: βi ←
{
ctrli ‖ EXPi ‖ FS i+1 ‖ γi+1 ‖ βi+1[0..c(r−2)−1]
}
⊕ PRG(hPRG(si ‖ IVi))[0..b+(r−1)c−1]
13: γi ← MAC(hMAC(si ‖ IVi);FS i ‖ βi ‖Oi)
14: Oi ← ENC(hENC(si); IVi;Oi+1)
15: end for
16: end procedure
Algorithm 1: Create a partial data packet.
Normally, an end host creates a packet that traverses the
whole path from the first node ndir0 to the last node n
dir
ldir−1.
It generates such a packet by setting k = 0, l = ldir−1, and
all ctrli = FWD in function CREATE ONION ROUTINE.
Generate splittable packets. Creating a data packet that can
be split into two packet requires an end host to first create
two children packets and then merge them into a single
packet. Because we require all packets to have the same size,
i.e., both children packets have to be of the same size as their
parent, the key challenge is to guarantee that the per-hop
MACs in the children packets successfully verify even after
the splitting node adds padding bits to the children packets.
For this reason, the splitting node generates padding bits by
a PRG keyed by the key shared with the end host, so that
the end host can predict the padding bits and pre-compute
the per-hop MACs in both resulting packets accordingly.
Algorithm 2 shows the function to cre-
ate a splittable data packet. At a high level,
CREATE SPLITTABLE DATA PACKET invokes the
CREATE ONION ROUTINE three times: it first creates two
children packets using CREATE ONION ROUTINE (Line 3
and 5), merges the resulting packets into a new payload
(Line 6), and finally executes CREATE ONION ROUTINE
again to generate the parent packet (Line 7). To ensure the
correctness of the per-hop MACs in the children packets
after the payloads are padded, the function generates the
padding bits using a PRG keyed by the shared key between
the end host and the splitting node so that the latter can
re-generate the padding bits accordingly (Lines 3 and 4).
After the MACs are computed for the children packets, the
deterministic padding bits are truncated so that two children
packets can fit into the payload of their parent packet.
1: procedure CREATE SPLITTABLE DATA PACKET
Input: {si}, {FSi}, {ctrli}, {EXPi}, IV , IV0, IV1 O0, O1, k
Output: (IV0,FS0, γ0, β0, O0)
2: O0 ← O0 ‖ PRG(hPRG((sk ⊕ IV0)‖ “left”))[0..m
2
+rc−1]
3: (IV ′0 , FS
′
0, γ
′
0, β
′
0, O
′
0)←
CREATE ONION ROUTINE({si,∀i ≥ k}, {FSi, ∀i ≥ k},
{FWD}, {EXPi,∀i ≥ k}, IV0, k, ldir − 1, O0)
4: O1 ← O1 ‖ PRG(hPRG((sk ‖ IV1)‖ “right”))[0..m
2
+rc−1]
5: (IV ′1 , FS
′
1, γ
′
1, β
′
1, O
′
1)←
CREATE ONION ROUTINE({si,∀i ≥ k},
{FSi, ∀i ≥ k}, {FWD}, IV1, k, ldir − 1, O1)
6: O′ ← (IV ′0 , FS′0, γ′0, β′0, {O′0}[0..m2 +rc−1]) ‖
(IV ′1 , FS
′
1, γ
′
1, β
′
1, {O′1}[0..m2 +rc−1])
7: (IV0, FS0, γ0, β0, O0)←
CREATE ONION ROUTINE({si,∀i < k},
{FSi, ∀i < k}, {FWD, . . . , FWD, SPLIT},
{EXPi,∀i < k}, IV, 0, k − 1, O′)
8: end procedure
Algorithm 2: Create a data packet that can be split into two
new packets.
5.3.4. Onion layer removal. Nodes remove onion layers
when processing data packets. It essentially reverses a single
step of CREATE ONION ROUTINE. Algorithm 3 details this
five step process. First, the intermediate node retrieves the
symmetric onion key s shared with the sender (Line 3);
second, the node verifies a per-hop MAC using a key derived
from s (Line 4); third, the node ensures that the packet’s size
remains unchanged by adding padding bits to the header
and decrypting the resulting padded header with a stream
cipher; fourth, the control bits are extracted (Line 6); finally,
the payload is decrypted (Line 7) and the next initialization
vector is obtained by applying a PRP keyed with s to the
current IV (Line 8).
Note that the onion layer removal algorithm is different
from a simple decryption in two ways. First, the size of the
packet remains the same after processing, which prevents
leaking information about the total number of hops between
the sender and receiver. Second, the processing only happens
at the head of the packet, which reveals no information about
the processing node’s position on the path.
Depending on the value of control bits ctrl, the inter-
mediate node performs one of the following two actions:
FWD, or SPLIT. A node can split a data packet into two
new packets by Algorithm 4. First, the payload is split into
two new packets (Line 2). Then the node pads both newly
generated packets to the fixed size m using pseudo-random
bits obtained from a PRG keyed by s (Line 3 and 4).
1: procedure REMOVE LAYER
Input: P , SV
Output: ctrl, P o, R, EXP
2: {IV ‖ FS ‖ γ ‖ β ‖O} ← P
3: s ‖R← PRP−1(SV,FS)
4: check γ = MAC(hMAC(s ‖ IV );FS ‖ β ‖O)
5: ζ ← {β ‖ 0c} ⊕ PRG(hPRG(s ‖ IV ))[0...(r−1)c+b−1]
6: ctrl ‖ EXP ‖ FS ′ ‖ γ′ ‖ β′ ← ζ
7: O′ ← DEC(hDEC(s); IV ;O)
8: IV ′ ← PRP(hPRP(s); IV )
9: P o ← {IV ′ ‖ FS ′ ‖ γ′ ‖ β′ ‖O′}
10: end procedure
Algorithm 3: Remove an onion layer.
1: procedure SPLIT ONION PACKET
Input: O, s, IV
Output: P o0 , P
o
1
2: {P ′0 ‖ P ′1} ← O
3: P o0 ← P ′0 ‖ PRG(hPRG((s ‖ IV ) ‖ “left”))[0..m2 +rc−1]
4: P o1 ← P ′1 ‖ PRG(hPRG((s ‖ IV ) ‖ “right”))[0..m2 +rc−1]
5: end procedure
Algorithm 4: Split a data packet into two new packets.
5.4. Data Transmission Phase
5.4.1. End host processing. To send packets to receiver
D, sender S first makes sure that the flowlet has not ex-
pired. Then S chooses a value EXPmin, which has to be
larger than its local time plus the end-to-end forwarding
delay plus the maximum global clock skew. We expect that
adding 1 s to the local time would be adequate for most
circumstances. However, S cannot set the packet expiration
time to be equal at every hop, as otherwise this value
could be used as common identifier (which violates the bit-
pattern unlinkability property. Instead, S chooses an offset
∆i ∈ [0,∆max] uniformly at random, for each node nfi on
the path. For every packet sent out, S determines EXPmin
and computes EXPi = EXPmin + ∆i for each node. The
value ∆ needs to be chosen large enough to ensure that the
interval [EXPmin, EXPmin + ∆] overlaps with the intervals
of a large number of other concurrent flows. We expect that
∆ ≈ 5 s would be a safe choice.
After determining {EXPi}, S also needs to decide which
flow mutation actions the packet will adopt. In case of packet
splitting, S also needs to decide where to split the packet.
For a packet that is forwarded to the receiver without being
split, we denote the payload to send is O. For a packet that is
split, we denote the payloads of the children packets as O0
and O1. Let k be the index of the node where the packet is
split. Accordingly, ctrli = FWD, ∀i 6= k. Third, S uses sSD
to encrypt the payload. This end-to-end encryption prevents
the last hop node from obtaining information about the data
payload. S also generates a unique nonce IV for the packet.
If the packet is splittable, S generates another two unique
nonces IV0 and IV1. Fourth, if the packet will be split, S
creates the packet P by
P = CREATE SPLITTABLE DATA PACKET({sfi }, {FSfi },
{ctrlfi }, {EXPfi }, IV, IV0, IV1, O0, O1, k) (1)
If the packet will only be forwarded to the receiver without
a splitting action, S creates the packet P by
P = CREATE ONION ROUTINE({sfi }, {FSfi }, {ctrlfi },
{EXPfi }, IV, 0, lf − 1, O) (2)
Finally, S forwards P to the first hop node towards the
receiver.
The process by which D sends packets back to S is sim-
ilar to the above procedure, but D will use the forwarding
segments and onion keys for the backward path. However,
right after S finishes the setup phase, D has not yet obtained
gxS , {sbi}, nor {FSbi }. In the TARANET data transmission
phase, the first packet that S sends to D includes xS , {sbi}
and {FSbi } as the payload.
When an end host (S or D) receives a data packet P ,
it can retrieve the data payload O from the packet by O =
P[rc..rc+m−1] The resulting O can thus be decrypted by sSD
to retrieve the plaintext payload.
5.4.2. Intermediate node processing. When a node re-
ceives a data packet P = (IV, FS, γ, β,O), with the local
secret SV , it first removes an onion layer by
ctrl, P o, R, EXP = REMOVE ONION LAYER(P, SV ) (3)
Note that the MAC must check in REMOVE ONION LAYER
for the process to move on. Otherwise, the node simply
drops the packet. Then, the node checks tcurr < EXP and
ensures that the flowlet has not expired. Afterwards, the
node checks the control bits belonging to the current hop.
If ctrl = SPLIT, the resulting payload P o must contain two
sub packets. The node creates two children packets P o0 , P
o
1 :
{P o0 , P o1 } = SPLIT ONION PACKET(O, s, IV ) (4)
Lastly, if the packet is not dropped, the node forwards the
resulting packet according to the routing decision R.
6. Security Analysis
We discuss TARANET’s defenses against passive (Sec-
tion 6.1) and active attacks (Section 6.2). We also conduct
a quantitative analysis of TARANET’s anonymity set size
using the Internet topology and real-world packet traces
(Section 6.3). Our result shows that TARANET’s anonymity
set is 4 to 218 times larger than those of LAP and Dovetail.
Finally, we present a formal proof that the TARANET
protocol conforms to an ideal onion routing protocol defined
by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17].
6.1. Defense against Passive Attacks
Flow dynamics matching. In flow-dynamics matching at-
tacks [24, 51], adversarial nodes can collude to match two
observed flows by their dynamics, such as transmission
rate. TARANET prevents such attacks by normalizing the
outgoing transmission rate of all flowlets through the use
of chaff traffic. Adversarial nodes are unable to distinguish
chaff traffic from real traffic. Accordingly, no flow dynamics
are available to the adversary to perform matching.
Template attacks. TARANET enables end hosts to shape
their traffic by adding chaff packets to hide their real traffic
patterns. The resulting traffic pattern of an outgoing flowlet
is uniform across the network. In addition, all TARANET
packets have the same length, preventing information leak-
age from packet length. The combination of these two
features completely neutralizes template attacks.
Network statistics correlation. These attacks rely on the
capability of the adversary to observe macroscopic flow
characteristics which leak de-anonymizing information. Be-
cause of the uniformity of flowlets, no such information is
leaked in TARANET for isolated unidirectional flows. How-
ever, if the attacker is able to link the flowlets corresponding
to a bidirectional flow by their starting or ending time, then
an attack based on the RTT (see Section 2.2.1) could still be
possible. Such an attack can be thwarted by adding delays
for setup packets and flowlet start at the receiver, according
to the path length (the shorter the path, the longer the delay),
as suggested by previous work [22, Section 5.1].
6.2. Defense against Active Attacks
Tagging attacks. A compromised node can modify packets
adding tags that are recognizable by downstream colluding
nodes. This enables flow matching across flows observed
at different nodes [55]. TARANET defends against such at-
tacks through its per-hop packet authenticity (see Section 5).
A benign node will detect and drop any modified packet.
Clogging attacks. In clogging attacks, an adversary in-
tentionally causes network congestion [50, 30], or fluctu-
ation [19] to create jamming or noticeable network jitter on
relay nodes, and match such patterns to deanonymize the
path. Different from throughput fingerprint attacks that aim
to exert no influence on existing traffic patterns, clogging
attacks aggressively change the traffic patterns on victim
links and are prone to detection. First, clogging attacks
in TARANET itself require DDoS capabilities because of
nodes’ high bandwidth within the network. In addition,
TARANET nodes attacked by clogging would run out of
cached chaff packets, which in turn shuts down the flowlet
and prevents any additional matching. Moreover, given the
large number of flowlets in the network at any given time,
the number of flowlets terminated due to normal operations
is large, which hides the fact that the specific attacked
flowlet is terminated.
Flow dynamics modification attacks. Traffic pattern mod-
ulation attacks require attackers to modulate inter-packet
intervals to either create recognizable patterns (e.g., flow wa-
termarking attacks [38, 36]), or embed identity information
(e.g. flow fingerprinting attacks [37]), so that downstream
adversarial nodes can deanonymize traffic by extracting the
introduced traffic patterns. Depending on the amount of
perturbation introduced by the adversary, we can distinguish
two cases. In the first one, the adversarial actions fail to
exhaust the cached chaff packets on the node under attack
for the target flowlet. In this case, the outgoing rate for the
flowlet at the node remains unchanged, and the attack is
ineffective. In the second case, the victim node runs out of
cached chaff packets for the target flowlet. In this case, the
node terminates the flowlet to prevent downstream nodes
from observing the injected patterns.
6.3. Anonymity Set Size Evaluation
Relationship anonymity set. Network-layer anonymity pro-
tocols are vulnerable to passive attacks based on network
topology information launched by a single compromised
AS. Compared to overlay-based anonymity systems [28] that
allows global re-routing, traffic of network-layer anonymity
protocols follows paths created by underlying network ar-
chitectures. By observing the incoming and outgoing links
of a packet, a compromised AS can derive network location
information of communicating end hosts. For example, in
Figure 3(a), by forwarding a packet from AS1 to AS3, AS2
knows that the sender must reside within the set {AS0,
AS1} and the receiver falls into the set {AS3, AS4, AS5}.
We name the former anonymity set sender anonymity set,
denoted as Ss, and call the latter anonymity set recipient
anonymity set, denoted as Sd. Accordingly, we define rela-
tionship anonymity set Sr = {(s, d)|s ∈ Ss, d ∈ Sd}.
To evaluate relationship anonymity of different proto-
cols, we use anonymity-set size as the metric. By definition
of Sr, the anonymity-set size |Sr| = |Ss| × |Sd|. In Fig-
ure 3(a), there are 8 hosts in both AS0 and AS1. Thus,
|Ss| = 16. Similarly, we can calculate that |Sd| = 24 and
|Sr| = 16× 24 = 384.
Protocol designs influence corresponding anonymity-
set sizes. In LAP and Dovetail, by analyzing header for-
mats, a passive adversary can determine its position on the
packet’s path, i.e., its distances from the sender and the
receiver [39, 57]. In Figure 3(a), if the adversary in AS2
knows the sender is 2 hops away and the receiver is 1 hops
away through analyzing packet headers, it can deduce that
the sender must be in AS0 and the receiver must be in AS3.
The resulting anonymity-set size is reduced to 8 * 8 = 64.
In comparison, TARANET and HORNET’s header designs
prevent their headers from leaking position information.
Experiment setup. We use a trace-based simulation to
evaluate anonymity set sizes of different network-layer an-
onymity protocols in real world scenarios. We obtain the
real-world AS-level topology from CAIDA AS relationship
dataset [1]. We also annotate each AS with its IPv4 address
space using the Routeview dataset [8]. In addition, we es-
timate real-world paths using iPlane traceroute datasets [6].
We use the traceroute traces on Dec. 12th, 2014. For each
IP address–based trace, we convert it to AS path. Our
preliminary analysis shows that the median AS path length is
4 and the average AS path length is 4.2. More than 99.99%
of AS paths have length less than 8.
For each AS on a path in our path dataset, we compute
the sizes of the relationship anonymity sets observed by the
compromised AS in one of two scenarios: 1) the AS knows
its position on path as in LAP and Dovetail; 2) the AS has
no information about its position on the path as in HORNET
and TARANET. To compute anonymity set sizes, we first
derive relationship anonymity sets composed by ASes. Then
we compute the number of hosts in the ASes as the size of
anonymity set size. We approximate the number of hosts
within an AS by the number of IPv4 addresses of that AS.
Result. Figure 3(b) demonstrates CDFs of anonymity-set
sizes for LAP and Dovetail observed by a compromised
AS. Figure 3(c) shows the CDF of anonymity-set sizes for
TARANET and HORNET. In general, anonymity-set sizes
of TARANET and HORNET exceed 232 with probabil-
ity larger than 95% regardless of the adversary’s on-path
positions. The 90th percentiles of anonymity-set sizes of
TARANET and HORNET are 4–218 times larger than those
of LAP and Dovetail depending on the distances between
senders and receivers. We remark that when an AS is 6 or
7 hops away from a sender, it is the last-hop AS with high
probability, because 99.99% paths are less than 8 hops long.
When the compromised ASes are 1 hop away from senders
and when the ASes are close to receivers (6–7 hops away
from senders), the gap between TARANET/HORNET and
LAP/Dovetail is largest.
Topology-based attacks and traffic analysis. In LAP,
Dovetail, and HORNET, when an adversary compromises
more than 1 AS on a path, he/she can correlate obser-
vation from different non-adjacent ASes by traffic anal-
ysis, such as flow fingerprint attacks [37], to facilitate
topology-based attacks. Assume that an adversary compro-
mises q ASes and observes a series of sender anonymity
sets {Sis; i ∈ [1, q]} and a series of recipient anonymity sets
{Sid; i ∈ [1, q]}. The resulting relationship anonymity set
size |Sr| = mini∈[1,q] |Sis|×mini∈[1,q] |Sid|. For example, in
Figure 3(a), if the adversary compromises AS0 besides AS2
and correlates traffic from the same flowlet, the resulting
relationship anonymity-set size |Sr| is only 24 (1 × 24)
compared to 384 when only AS2 is compromised.
TARANET improves over LAP, Dovetail, and HOR-
NET by introducing defense against traffic analysis (see
Section 6.1 and 6.2). By defeating traffic analysis and
preventing correlation of flowlets at multiple non-adjacent
ASes, TARANET enlarges the observed relationship ano-
nymity set size. The resulting relationship anonymity set
is only the smallest one among the relationship anonym-
ity sets observed by non-collaborative compromised ASes.
|Sr| = mini∈[1,q] |Sis| × |Sid|. For instance, when the adver-
sary compromises AS0 besides AS2 and uses traffic analysis
to correlate observed flowlets, the resulting relationship
anonymity-set size |Sr| increased to 56.
6.4. Formal Proof of Security
Proof of TARANET security comes into two parts: the
security proof of TARANET’s setup phase protocol, and
the security proof of TARANET’s data transmission phase.
We derive the security of TARANET’s setup phase by the
security of the Sphinx protocol [25], because TARANET’s
setup phase protocol directly uses the Sphinx protocol and
Danezis and Goldberg have demonstrated that the Sphinx
protocol realizes an ideal onion routing protocol defined by
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17].
In this section, we focus on the security of TARANET’s
data transmission phase and prove that TARANET’s data
transmission phase is equivalent to an ideal onion rout-
ing protocol based on UC framework [17]. According to
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, a protocol is an ideal onion
routing protocol if it offers four properties: correctness,
integrity, wrap-resistance, and security. We briefly rephrase
the definitions of four properties as follows:
• Correctness. The protocol should operate correctly
without adversaries.
• Integrity. There exists an upper bound N for the pro-
tocol, such that an adversary cannot forget a message
that traverse more than N hops in the network.
• Wrap-resistance. Given an output packet of an uncom-
promised node, an adversary cannot forget the corre-
sponding input packet.
• Security. An adversary cannot distinguish among pack-
ets that enter an uncontrolled node n even if the adver-
sary is able to 1) select paths for the packets forwarded
by n, 2) control all nodes on the path except n, and
3) observe all input and output packets of n except the
challenge packets.
6.4.1. Correctness. A careful scrutiny of Section 5 should
suffice to demonstrate the correctness of TARANET’s data
transmission protocol.
6.4.2. Integrity. We show that with significantly less than
2k work, an adversary cannot forge a message (IV0, FS0,
γ0, β0, O0) that traverses more than r hops nodes n0, n1,
· · · , nr in the network, even if the adversary learns all the
secret keys SV0, SV1, · · · , SVr for the nodes on the path.
We construct a proof of contradiction.
For convenience, we introduce a series of notations:
ω(x, y) = PRP−1(hPRP(x); y)[0..k−1] (5)
ρ(iv, x, y) = PRG(hPRG(ω(x, y)⊕ iv)) (6)
σ(iv, x, y) = PRP(hPRP(ω(x, y)); iv) (7)
τ(iv, x, y, o) = DEC(hDEC(ω(x, y)); iv; o) (8)
Assume that the adversary can create a message (IV0,
FS0, γ0, β0, O0) that traverses n0, n1, · · · , nr. We can
rewrite the message received by nr, (IVr, FSr, γr, βr, Or),
AS2 (16)
AS1 (8) AS3 (8)
AS4 (8)
AS5 (8)
S
D
AS0 (8)
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(c) TARANET and HORNET
Figure 3. a) A toy example of an adversary that exploits topology information to de-anonymize a flowlet between sender S and receiver D. ASx (y)
denotes an AS with AS number x and y hosts attached. We assume that the adversary compromised AS2. b) Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) of
anonymity set sizes for LAP and Dovetail. c) CDFs of anonymity set sizes for TARANET and HORNET. In both b) and c), different lines demonstrate
anonymity set size distribution observed by an adversary that is a fixed number of AS hops away from S.
as follows:
FSr =
r−1⊕
i=0
ρ(IVi, SVi, FSi)[c(r−i−1)+b..c(r−i−1)+b+|FS|−1]
(9)
γr =
r−1⊕
i=0
ρ(IVi, SVi, FSi)[c(r−i−1)+b+|FS|..c(r−i−1)+b+|FS|+k−1]
(10)
βr =
r−1⊕
i=1
ρ(IVi, SVi, FSi)[c(r−i)..cr−1] (11)
where IVi+1 = σ(SVi, FSi, IVi) and Oi =
τ(IVi, SVi, FSi, Oi−1) ∀ 0 < i < r.
In order for the MAC to check on node nr so that nr
will forward the packet, we need:
γr = MAC(hMAC(ω(SVr, FSr));FSr||βr||Or) (12)
If we substitute Equation 9, 10, and 11 into Equation 12,
the right side of Equation 12 becomes a function with input
(IV0, O0, SV0, · · · , SVr, FS0, · · · , FSr−1):
γr = MAC(hMAC(ω(SVr, FSr));FSr||βr||Or)
= µ(IV0, O0, SV0, · · · , SVr, FS0, · · · , FSr) (13)
Before continuing, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6.1. With significantly less than 2k work, an ad-
versary can only distinguish µ(IV0, O0, SV0, · · · , SVr,
FS0, · · · , FSr−1) from a random oracle with negligible
probability.
Proof. We prove a statement equivalent to the lemma: with
significantly less than 2k work, an adversary cannot find two
sets
(IV0, O0, SV0, · · · , SVr, FS0, · · · , FSr−1) 6=
(IV ′0 , O
′
0, SV
′
0 , · · ·′ , SV ′r , FS′0, · · · , FS′r−1) (14)
such that they lead to the same value of µ. We will prove
this by proof of contradiction.
Assume the adversary found two distinguished values
that yields the same value of µ. Because MAC is a random
oracle, with significantly less than 2k work, the attacker has
to guarantee:
ω(SVr, FSr) = ω(SV
′
r , FS
′
r) (15)
(FSr||βr||Or) = (FS′r||β′r||O′r) (16)
Given the definition of ω and Equation 15, because
PRPis a pseudo-random permutation and hPRP is collision
resistant, the adversary must have SVr = SV ′r .
In addition, Equation 16 determines FSr = FS′r, βr =
β′r. We will show that the latter means
(IV0, SV0, · · · , SVr−1, FS0, · · · , FSr−1) =
(IV ′0 , SV
′
0 , · · · , SV ′r−1, FS′0, · · · , FSr−1)′ (17)
Consider the last c bits of βr and β′r. By Equation 11,
we have
ρ(IVr−1, SVr−1, FSr−1)[c(r−1)..cr−1] =
ρ(IV ′r−1, SV
′
r−1, FS
′
r−1)[c(r−1)..cr−1] (18)
Because PRG is a secure pseudo-random generator, the
following equation holds
ω(SVr−1, FSr−1)⊕ IVr−1 = ω(SV ′r−1, FS′r−1)⊕ IV ′r−1
(19)
Or
ω(SVr−1, FSr−1)⊕ σ(SVr−2, FSr−2, IVr−2) =
ω(SV ′r−1, FS
′
r−1)⊕ σ(SV ′r−2, FS′r−2, IV ′r−2) (20)
Since ω and σ are two independent random oracles and
their inputs do not overlap, the attacker has to ensure
SVr−1 = SV ′r−1, FSr−1 = FS
′
r−1, SVr−2 = SV
′
r−2,
FSr−2 = FS′r−2, and IVr−2 = IV
′
r−2.
The equation that IVr−2 = IVr−2 implies FSr−3 =
FS′r−3, SVr−3 = SV
′
r−3, and IVr−3 = IV
′
r−3, because
σ is a random oracle. Repeating this logic, we will get
Equation 17.
Finally, given Or = O′r and Equation 17, the attacker,
with significantly less than 2k work, has to make sure that
O0 = O
′
0.
Let
f(IVi, SVi, FSi) = ρ(IVi, SVi, FSi)[c(r−i)..cr−1] (21)
We now can substitute Equation 10 and 21 into Equation 13
and rewrite the latter as:
f(IV0, SV0, FS0) =µ(IV0, O0, SV0, · · · , SVr, FS0, · · · , FSr)+
r−1⊕
i=1
f(IVi, SVi, FSi) (22)
Because MAC is not used in f , the right hand side of the
above equation is also a random oracle, which we can denote
as
g(IV0, O0, SV0, · · · , SVr, FS0, · · · , FSr) (23)
To sum up, in order for the MAC γr to check on node
nr, the attacker needs to find the solution to
f(IV0, SV0, FS0) = g(IV0, O0, SV0, · · · , SVr, FS0, · · · , FSr)
(24)
with two independent random oracles f and g. With signif-
icantly less than 2k effort, the adversary can only succeed
with negligible probability, which contradicts the assump-
tion.
6.4.3. Wrap resistance. We prove that given a packet
(IV, FS, γ, β,O), an adversary cannot output a message
(IV ′, FS′, γ′, β′, O′) with significantly less than 2k work,
so that processing of the former packet on an uncompro-
mised node leads to the latter one.
If the adversary can succeed with significantly less than
2k work, it is necessary that
ρ(IV ′, SV, FS′)[c(r−1)..cr−1] = β[c(r−1)..cr−1] (25)
Because PRP−1, PRG, hPRP, and hPRG are all random
oracles and SV is unknown to the adversary, with signif-
icantly less than 2k work, the adversary can only succeed
to generate correct values of (IV ′, FS′) with negligible
probability.
6.4.4. Security. To prove the security property, we con-
struct the following game G0. Given an uncompromised
node N , the adversary selects two paths n0, n1, · · · , nν−1
(0 < ν <= r) and n′0, n
′
1, · · · , n′ν′−1 (0 < ν′ <= r)
where ni = n′i ∀0 ≤ i ≤ j and nj = n′j = N . The
nodes following N are not necessarily the same sets of the
nodes and the length of two paths can be different. The
adversary is also able to choose all secrets for all nodes
except for N, including the public/private keys and local
secrets. Moreover, the adversary can also arbitrarily decide
the contents of payload O.
The challenger randomly selects a bit b and proceeds in
one of the two following ways:
b = 0. The challenger establishes a flowlet through
the path n0, · · · , nν−1 and then creates a data packet with
payload O chosen by the adversary. The challenger out-
puts (IV0, FS0, γ0, β0, O0), which can be sent to node n0.
We use (IVi, FSi, γi, βi, Oi) to represent the corresponding
packet received by node ni (n′i) on the path.
b = 1. The challenger establishes a flowlet through the
alternate path n′0, · · · , n′ν′−1 and outputs a data packet (IV0,
FS0, γ0, β0, O0) that can be sent to n1.
Given the output (IV0, FS0, γ0, β0, O0), the adversary is
challenged to determine b. The adversary can additionally
input up to q messages so long as they are not equal to
(IVj , FSj , γj , βj , Oj).
The adversary’s advantage is defined as
adv = |Pr(success)− 1
2
|
We will show that the advantage is negligible with less than
2k work.
Proof. We use a hybrid-game method by establishing the
following two new games G1 and G2. The definition of G1
is the same as G0 except that we require that N = n0 =
n′0, i.e., the first node is uncompromised. We further define
G2, whose assumption is the same as G1 with only one
exception that (IV0, FS0, γ0, β0, Oe) are randomly drawn
from the corresponding domains.
First, because in G2, the message are all randomly
drawn, the adversary’s advantage in guessing the bit is
0. Next, we would show that in a chain of game G0 →
G1 → G2, the adversary can only distinguish a game from
the previous game with negligible success probability with
significantly less than 2k work.
G0 → G1. On one hand, it is obvious that an adversary
who can succeed in G0 is able to succeed in G1 as the
former one is a more general game. On the other hand,
because the adversary fully control nodes n0, · · · , nj−1 and
can thus emulate their packet processing, the adversary can
win game G0 if s/he can win G1.
G1 → G2. In order to distinguish G2 from G1, the
following statements must be true:
• The adversary can distinguish FS0 = PRP(hPRP(SV0);
s0||R0) from randomness without knowing SV0. Be-
cause PRP is pseudo-random permutation with security
parameter k, the probability that the adversary succeeds
with less than 2k work is negligible.
• The adversary can distinguish
β0 = PRG(hPRG(SV0)⊕IV0)[c(r−1)..cr−1]⊕
ctrl1||FS1||γ1||β1) (26)
from random bits. Because PRG is secure pseudo-
random number generator, and the adversary has no
knowledge of SV0, the probability that the adversary
succeeds is negligible.
• We can repeat the same logic to show that it is impos-
sible to distinguish γ0 and O0 from random bits with
non-negligible probability with significantly less than
2k work.
7. Evaluation
This section describes our implementation of
TARANET, a performance evaluation,and our evaluation of
bandwidth overhead added by end-to-end traffic shaping.
7.1. Implementation on High-speed Routers
We implement TARANET’s setup and data transmission
logic on a software router. We use Intel’s Data Plane Devel-
opment Kit (DPDK [4], version 2.1.0), which supports fast
packet processing in user space. We assemble a customized
cryptography library based on the Intel AESNI sample
library [5], and the curve25519-donna [3] and PolarSSL [7]
libraries. We use 128-bit AES counter mode for encryption
and 128-bit AES CBC-MAC.
7.2. Performance Evaluation
Our testbed is composed of a commodity Intel server
and a Spirent TestCenter packet generator [10]. The Intel
server functions as a software router and is equipped with
an Intel Xeon E5-2560 CPU (2.70 GHz, 2 sockets, 8 cores
per socket) and 64 GB DRAM. The server also has 3
Intel 82599ES network cards with 4 ports per card, and is
connected to the packet generator through twelve 10-Gbps
links. Thus the testbed can test throughput up to 120 Gbps.
To remove implementation bias and allow fair com-
parison with other anonymity protocols, we additionally
implement LAP [39], Dovetail [57], HORNET [22], and
Sphinx [25] logic using our custom cryptography library and
DPDK. Note that LAP, Dovetail, and HORNET are high-
speed network-layer anonymity protocols but cannot defend
against traffic analysis attacks. Sphinx is a mix network that
requires performing public key cryptographic operations for
every data packet and incurs high computation overhead.
We remind the reader that TARANET’s performance
is lower than LAP, Dovetail, and HORNET, because
TARANET’s traffic-analysis resistance property incurs ad-
ditional overhead by design. However, TARANET should
outperform Sphinx, which also offers traffic-analysis resis-
tance. Additionally, as an essential requirement of high-
speed network-layer anonymity protocol, we expect that
TARANET should sustain high forwarding throughput.
Processing latency. We first evaluate the average latency
of processing a data packet on a single core using different
anonymity protocols. For TARANET, we also compare the
latency of performing different mutation actions. The results
are shown in Figure 4(a).
TARANET’s processing latency is comparable to LAP,
Dovetail, and HORNET. When the payload size is smaller
than 64 bytes, processing a TARANET data packet (follow-
ing the steps described above) incurs less than 1µs (≈3700
cycles) per-hop overhead on a single core. For payloads
larger than 1024 bytes, the latency increases to up to 2µs
(≈7200 cycles). Splitting a TARANET packet incurs only
additional 1µs (≈4200 cycles). Since the total number of
ASes on a path is usually less than 7 [22], TARANET
processing will add only ∼20µs to the end-to-end latency.
Processing a setup packet on our test machine incurs
around 250µs (0.66M cycles) per hop per packet. This is
due to setup packets requiring a DH key-exchange operation.
However, for path lengths of less than 7 hops, this latency
adds less than 2ms at the start of each flowlet.
Goodput. Goodput measures the throughput of useful data
that can be transmitted by the protocol as it separates data
throughput and packet header overhead. Figures 4(b) and
4(c) show the goodput of different protocols with 7-hop and
14-hop headers, respectively, on a single 10 Gbps link with 1
core assigned. We observe that even with longer processing
latency and larger headers, TARANET still achieves ≈45%
of HORNET’s goodput in both cases. With a single core,
TARANET can still achieve ∼0.37 Mpkt/s.
Maximum total throughput. To evaluate the maximum
total throughput of our protocol with respect to the number
of cores, we test TARANET with all twelve 10 Gbps ports
enabled while using all 16 CPU cores. Each port has 1 input
queue and 1 output queue. To fully distribute the computa-
tion power of 16 cores to 12 input and 12 output queues, we
assign 8 cores exclusively to 8 input queues, 4 cores each to
one input and one output queue, and the remaining 4 cores
to 8 output queues. The packet generator generates packets
that have random egress ports and saturate all 12 ports.
Our evaluation finds that TARANET can process anonymous
traffic at 50.96 Gbps on our software router for packets with
512 bytes of payload, which is comparable to the switching
capacity of a commercial edge router [2].
Delay of flowlet setup. For the setup phase, TARANET
uses packet batching and randomization to protect against
traffic analysis. Our observation is that if the number of
flowlet setups is sufficient large, batching setup packets can
still end up yielding a short setup delay.
We conduct a trace-driven simulation using the CAIDA’s
anonymized packet traces to evaluate the setup phase’s
delay. The packet traces are recorded by the “equinix-
chicago” monitor on a Tier-1 ISP’s 10 Gbps link between
1-2 pm on Mar. 20th, 2014 [11] We assume the first packet
in each flow in the dataset is a flowlet setup packet. We
simulate the latency introduced by batching, randomizing,
and cryptographic processing by injecting the setup packet
trace into a TARANET node and varying the batch size.
The resulting latency of flowlet setups increases almost
linearly as the batch sizes increases. When the batch size
is 16, the per-hop latency is 1.6 ± 1.0 ms (95% confidence
interval). When the batch sizes reaches 128, the per-hop
latency increases up to 12 ± 7 ms. For a path with 7
AS-hops that means the flowlet setup will introduce less
than ∼170 ms additional round-trip latency for the setup
phase, which is a small proportion of the delay of an inter-
continental path.
7.3. Overhead Evaluation
We conduct a trace-based evaluation of TARANET to
evaluate added bandwidth overhead for end hosts and the
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Figure 4. a) Average latency of processing a packet for different protocols with error bars (95% confidence intervals). For a packet with “SPLIT” flag,
because the payload has to contain at least two other packet headers, we only test packets with payloads at least 768 bytes. Lower is better. b) Data
forwarding goodput on a 10 Gbps link for packets with 7-hop headers and different payload sizes; c) data forwarding goodput on a 10 Gbps link for
packets with 14-hop headers and different payload sizes. Higher is better.
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Figure 5. a) Probability of splittable packets to guarantee different success rate. Failure counter H = 2. Different lines stand for different success rates.
b) Probability of splittable packets for different parameter H (See Section 4.2) to achieve a 95% success rate. c) Bandwidth overhead caused by added
chaff traffic for traffic shaping. We normalize the overhead by dividing the added overhead by the original bandwidth. Lower is better.
amount of state for routers. For bandwidth overhead, we
evaluate the number of splittable packets required to ac-
commodate different levels of packet drops and the number
of chaff traffic needed to shape real-world traffic. We use
CAIDA’s anonymized packet traces as discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2. We filter away ICMP packets and small flows that
has the size smaller than 10 packets or has the transmission
rate lower than 1 byte/second.
Split rate. First, we evaluate the number of splittable
packets needed to account for packet drops. Note that an
insufficient split rate causes a node to deplete its locally
cached chaff and prematurely terminate a flowlet when there
exist large number of packet drops. We convert each flow in
the trace into flowlets where B = 10 kbps and T = 1 min
and run the trace with different per-hop split rates, different
drop rates, and various failure counters H . We set Lchf = 3
to let a node to cache 3 chaff packets at maximum for each
flowlet. Figure 5(a) shows the required per-hop split rates
regarding different drop rates to achieve different success
rates. The observed drop rate in the Internet is around
0.2% [61]. For such a low drop rate and a failure counter
H = 2, a node can set the per-hop split rate to almost
0 and still obtain high success rates as much as 99%. To
account for a highly lossy network link or an adversary that
manipulates timing pattern through dropping packets, an end
host can adjust the split rate up to 5% even for a very high
per-hop drop rate 10% to achieve 95% success rates.
Figure 5(b) demonstrates the required per-hop split rates
with respect to different drop rates to guarantee a 95%
success rate when the failure counter H ranges from 1
to 5. In general, given a certain packet drop rate, a larger
H helps reduce the per-hop split rate. For instance, when
H=1, the per-hop split rate can be as high as 12% for a
packet drop rate of 5%. However, when H increases to 2,
the required per-hop split rate is already at 3.4%. When we
lets H=4, we can accommodate a per-hop drop rate of 15%
by a per-hop split rate as small as 3.7%. We remark that
when flowlets have smaller bandwidth B (as will be shown
next), the success rate increases.
Chaff overhead. We then evaluate the bandwidth overhead
of the added chaff traffic. We convert real-world flows in the
CAIDA’s packet traces into flowlets and compute the amount
of chaff required. Note that we normalize the resulting
overhead through dividing it by the total traffic volumes, in
order to remove the impact of traffic volumes and network
sizes.
Figure 5(c) plots the chaff overhead needed for the
conversion when the bandwidth parameter of flowlets B
varies and T=1 min. Generally, large B results in large chaff
overhead. When we use B=5 kbps, the overhead of chaff
packets is 7%. In comparison, when B becomes 20 kbps,
the overhead of chaff traffic is increased to 31%. Moreover,
we observe that small flow sizes, such as UDP flows for
DNS lookups, lead to large chaff overhead given the same
B because more packets in the resulting flowlets are chaff
packets. In Figure 5(c), the chaff overhead for UDP flows
is larger than for TCP flows because the size of UDP flows
is usually larger than the size of TCP flows.
Required amount of state and scalability. To enable
traffic shaping for flowlets, an intermediate node maintains
state bounded by the node’s bandwidth (Section 4.2). To
demonstrate the scalability of TARANET with respect to
the Internet traffic volumes, we evaluate the amount of state
required for a node to process real Internet traffic.
For each flowlet that consumes bandwidth B, a node
maintains Lchf chaff packets and a failure counter required
by the end-to-end traffic shaping technique (Section 4.2).
We set Lchf = 3 and vary the bandwidth parameter B for
flowlets. Using the flowlets converted from our CAIDA flow
trace, we can evaluate the amount of state required. Our
results show that a node stores 90 MB state when B=10 kbps
for a 10 Gbps link and that the node needs to store 52 MB
state when B=20 kbps.
8. Discussion
8.1. Incremental Deployment
Deployment Incentives. We envision that ISPs have incen-
tives to deploy TARANET to offer strong anonymity as a
service to their privacy-sensitive users or other customer
ISPs who in turn desire to offer anonymous communica-
tion services. This would give TARANET-deploying ISPs a
competitive advantage: both private and business customers
who want to use an anonymity service would choose an ISP
that offers privacy protection.
Incremental Deployment Strategy. The minimal require-
ment for deploying TARANET includes a topology server
that distributes path information, a few ISPs that deploy
border routers supporting the TARANET protocol, and end
hosts that run TARANET client software. We remark that the
network architectures that we consider, such as NIRA [69],
NEBULA [13] and SCION [70], already assume such topol-
ogy servers as part of necessary control-plane infrastructure.
Admittedly, the more ISPs that deploy TARANET would
increase the anonymity set size which in turn benefits all
users. However, a few initial TARANET-enabled ISPs that
share no physical links can establish tunnels between each
other through legacy ISPs and start to carry anonymous traf-
fic among users. As more TARANET-capable ISPs join the
TARANET network, tunnels are increasingly replaced with
direct ISP-to-ISP connections, which provides increasingly
better guarantees.
8.2. Limitations
Long-term Intersection Attack. An adversary who ob-
serves presence of all sender and receiver clients over a long
period of time can perform intersection analysis [26, 46] to
reveal pairs of clients that are repeatedly online during the
same period. Clients can minimize their risk by being online
not only when they are actively communicating, but in gen-
eral this attack is difficult to defend against through technical
means. For further defenses, TARANET could be enhanced
using existing solutions, such as dummy connections [15], or
with the Buddies system [68], which allows clients to control
which subset of pseudonyms appears online for a particular
session. We leave analysis and evaluation of integration with
such systems to future work.
Routing Attacks. TARANET relies on underlying net-
work architectures for routing packets. Adversarial nodes
can attack underlying network architectures to place them-
selves at strategic positions to launch traffic analysis [63,
60]. Although defeating routing attacks itself is beyond
TARANET’s scope, the network architecture candidates we
consider offer control and integrity of packets’ paths that
prevent routing attacks. For example, SCION [70] and NEB-
ULA [13] both embed integrity tags within paths to prevent
path modification. Pathlet [32] pushes path selection to end
hosts, enabling end hosts to select the traversing path.
Denial-of-Service Attacks. An adversary can initiate a high
volume of flowlets passing through a node, to exhaust
the nodes computation power, bandwidth, and memory.
TARANET itself cannot defend against such a DoS attack.
To mitigate the DoS attack, a node can require flowlet
initiators to solve cryptographic puzzles [26]. Additionally,
an ISP that operates TARANET can also directly restrict the
average flowlet-initiation rate of its customers. We note that
a DoS attack aiming to exhaust a TARANET’s memory state
by initiating large number of flowlets will fail, because the
amount of state that a TARANET node maintains is strictly
linear to the node’s actual bandwidth. If the adversary is
able to accumulate sufficient bandwidth, such an attack will
only jam the network link of the victim node and become
a bandwidth-based DoS attack that can be mitigated.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that it is possible to obtain
the efficiency of onion-routing-based anonymity systems
and the security of mix-based systems while avoiding their
disadvantages. We have designed TARANET, which uses
mixing and coordinated traffic shaping to thwart traffic
analysis for the setup phase and the data transmission phase
respectively. To achieve high performance and scalability,
we build on the key observation that high-speed networks
process enough volume that mixing at their core routers
has minimal performance overhead. The performance and
security properties achieved by our protocol suggest that
efficient traffic-analysis-resistant protocol at the network
layer is feasible, and that the increased security warrants
the additional performance cost.
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